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Abstract 
Williams syndrome (WS) is associated with relatively strong language abilities despite mild 
to moderate intellectual disability, particularly when language is indexed by vocabulary. The 
aim of the study was twofold: (1) to investigate whether reported lexical anomalies in WS 
can be explained with reference to anomalous semantic development; (2) to assess whether 
receptive vocabulary skills in WS, a relative strength, are underpinned by commensurate 
semantic knowledge. The development of lexical-semantic knowledge was investigated in 45 
typically developing (TD) individuals (CA range: 5-10, MA range: 5-13) and 15 individuals 
with WS (CA range: 12-50, MA range: 4-17), by means of (a) a categorisation task and (b) a 
definitions task, which was expected to make additional metacognitive demands. At younger 
ages, the performance level of TD individuals and individuals with WS did not differ on the 
definitions task. However, the WS group’s ability to define words fell away from the level 
predicted by the TD group at older ages, as more sophisticated definitions were expected. The 
results of the categorisation task indicated that individuals with WS had less lexical-semantic 
knowledge than expected given their level of receptive vocabulary, although from this lower 
level, the knowledge then developed at a similar rate to that found in typical development. 
We conclude first that conventional vocabulary measures may overestimate lexical-semantic 
knowledge in WS, and second concerns about the metacognitive demands of the definitions 
task when used with atypical populations may be well founded (cf. Benelli et al., 1988). 
 
Abbreviations: Williams syndrome (WS), typically developing (TD), chronological age (CA), 
mental age (MA), verbal mental age (VMA), British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 
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Introduction 
The uneven cognitive profiles presented by various developmental disorders are often used to 
investigate different aspects of cognition and to inform theories of cognitive development. 
Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder, with a prevalence estimated 
to be about 1 in 20,000 (Morris, Dempsey, Leonard, Dilts & Blackburn, 1988), resulting from 
a microdeletion of more than 25 genes from one copy of chromosome 7 (Ewart et al., 1993, 
see Donnai & Karmiloff-Smith, 2000). The disorder is characterised by an uneven cognitive 
profile: despite particular difficulties with visuospatial and numerical cognition, language 
abilities appear less impaired in individuals with WS (Ansari, Donlan, Thomas, Ewing, Peen 
& Karmiloff-Smith, 2003; Donnai & Karmiloff-Smith, 2000; Farran & Jarrold, 2003; 
Howlin, Davies & Udwin, 1998). Moreover, some researchers have claimed that language is 
‘selectively preserved’ in WS (e.g. Bellugi et al., 1990; Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Jones, Lai & 
St. George, 2000), and have used the apparent disparity between language and other areas of 
cognitive ability as evidence that language develops independently (as a module) from those 
other cognitive abilities (e.g. Anderson, 1998; Bellugi, Marks, Birhle & Sabo, 1988; Rossen, 
Bihrle, Klima, Bellugi, & Jones, 1996). Although such claims would clearly be of great 
theoretical importance if correct, their validity has been questioned by other researchers.   
In a theoretical objection, Thomas and colleagues (Thomas, Dockrell, Messer, Parmigiani, 
Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006) pointed out that the logic of such claims is based on the 
assumption that deficits in the current state of a cognitive system directly reflect the 
conditions of the initial state, ignoring the role of development in determining the current 
state (see Thomas, Purser & Richardson, in press, for discussion). An empirical objection to 
claims of a language advantage in WS was made by Brock (2007), who reviewed existing 
studies and concluded that there is, in fact, little evidence that morphology, phonology, 
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pragmatics, or syntax are better than predicted by nonverbal measures. An alternative (and 
perhaps more conservative) view, then, is that the cognitive profile associated with WS 
reflects the outcome of atypical development, with multiple interacting constraints, that has 
stronger effects on some cognitive abilities and weaker effects on others (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998). Nevertheless, although delayed, language development in WS shows many similarities 
to typical language development, albeit with some noted exceptions in early precursors 
(Thomas, 2008; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2005).  
Although younger children with WS have receptive vocabularies in line with their verbal 
mental age (Thal, Bates, & Bellugi, 1989; Volterra, Caselli, Capirci, Tonucci, & Vicari, 
2003), this area of language appears to be a relative strength for older children and adults 
with the disorder (e.g. Brock, Jarrold, Farran, Laws, & Riby, 2007; Rossen et al., 1996). 
Indeed, one notable feature of vocabulary in WS is the reported prevalence of rare or low-
frequency words in discourse (Bellugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 1994; Udwin & Dennis, 1995). 
These unusual choices of words can contain unnecessary, or even inappropriate, contextual 
details (Rossen et al., 1996), leading the speech of individuals with WS to be described as 
displaying ‘cocktail party syndrome’, referring to the tendency to talk at length with only 
superficial understanding (Bellugi, Birhle, Neville, Jernigan, & Doherty, 1992). 
This phenomenon has led to the suggestion that the lexicon is atypical in WS. For example, 
Rossen et al. (1996) investigated how individuals with WS interpret homonyms, such as 
‘bank’. It was found that the 10- to 18-year-old participants with WS interpreted homonyms 
with the secondary meaning (‘river’) as often as the first meaning (‘place that stores money’) 
and more often than both individuals with Down syndrome (DS), matched on both mental 
age (MA) and chronological age (CA), and typically-developing 10-year-olds. Rossen and 
colleagues suggested that these group differences resulted from atypical inhibitory processes 
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failing to integrate contextual information in the lexicon. Temple, Almazan, and Sherwood 
(2002) have also argued for an atypical lexicon in WS, drawing evidence from a word-picture 
matching task adapted from the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS: Dunn, Dunn, 
Whetton, & Burley, 1997), but involving fine-grained semantically-related distractors. 
Compared to a typically developing control group matched on MA, their participants with 
WS performed poorly, leading Temple and colleagues to conclude that individuals with WS 
have difficulties storing or activating semantic information in the lexicon. 
However, many studies have cast doubt on suggestions of atypical lexical structure in WS. In 
verbal short-term memory tasks, individuals with WS have demonstrated similar semantic 
effects to control groups matched on receptive vocabulary and digit span, with superior recall 
for concrete over abstract words (Laing, Grant, Thomas, Parmigiani, Ewing, & Karmiloff-
Smith, 2005). Moreover, Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, Karmiloff-Smith, Voice, Stevens, 
Grant, Udwin, Davies, & Howlin, 1997) found normal sensitivity to semantic priming in a 
WS group: responses were quicker to words preceded by either a functionally-related word or 
a category-related word than when preceded by an unrelated word. Furthermore, Bellugi and 
colleagues found no differences between a WS group and an age- and IQ-matched group with 
DS on a word definition task (Bellugi et al., 1990). 
Thomas and colleagues investigated possible atypical dynamics in lexical access in WS 
(Thomas et al., 2006), using a speeded picture-naming task in which frequency and semantic 
category were manipulated as implicit variables. Although the participants with WS were 
slower and less accurate than a control group matched on receptive vocabulary, the frequency 
and semantic category effects shown by the participants with WS were found to be in line 
with controls, indicating normal encoding of frequency in the WS lexicon and a similar 
categorical structure.  
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Further evidence has been gained from semantic fluency tasks. Despite Bellugi and 
colleagues’ widely-cited finding that a WS group produced more atypical responses in a 
semantic fluency task than a DS group when the semantic category was animals (Bellugi et 
al., 1990), the authors did not present any statistical analyses of the typicality of response. 
Subsequent investigations of semantic fluency in WS have largely failed to find group 
differences in typicality or frequency of verbal output (e.g. Jarrold, Hartley, Phillips, & 
Baddeley, 2000; Johnson & Carey, 1998; but see Temple et al., 2002). However, the 
possibility remains that metacognitive demands in such tasks, such as retrieval strategies and 
evaluation of task completion, might cloud our view of the underlying structure of the WS 
lexicon; individuals with WS might reveal an atypical lexicon in spontaneous speech despite 
not doing so in semantic fluency tasks. 
Recently, Stojanovik and Ewijk (2008) pointed out that evidence from spontaneous speech is 
also problematic because conversational context is unconstrained. Some people with WS 
have been reported to hold specialised interests (Udwin, Howlin, & Davies, 1996), 
presumably with attendant specialist vocabulary that may emerge in constrained spontaneous 
speech (i.e., speech directed at topics of interest). Therefore, Stojanovik and Ewijk (2008) 
measured vocabulary diversity in a topic-constrained spontaneous speech task, with a WS 
group and control groups matched on receptive language and CA. The WS group produced 
neither more varied words nor more atypical words than the control groups, but, in fact, 
produced fewer of the lowest frequency words than controls. 
There are hints from existing developmental studies indicating that lexical-semantic 
knowledge may be acquired atypically in WS. Stevens and Karmiloff-Smith (1997) argued 
that, when learning new words, children with WS were subject to the fast mapping and 
mutual exclusivity constraints, but not the taxonomic or whole-object constraints. Moreover, 
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Mervis and Bertrand (1997) found that children with WS learn words less referentially than 
typically-developing children, and that the stage of rapid vocabulary growth is less connected 
to semantic categorisation ability than it is in typical development. While Temple and 
colleagues (Temple et al., 2002) argue that such studies provide evidence that individuals 
with WS have an atypical lexical structure from the start of development, this need not be the 
case. For example, it is possible that atypical early learning processes have an impact on the 
type of lexical-semantic information encoded, with the lexicon structured normally. The 
former view attributes the use of unusual words in WS to a lexicon with atypical dynamics, 
the latter as a consequence of atypical learning processes. 
Overall, our ability to assess the developing structure of the WS lexicon has been 
compromised by concerns about the limitations of the tasks used to assess it. Tyler and 
colleagues (Tyler et al., 1997) suggest that the lexical-semantic tasks that are difficult for 
participants with WS are often off-line tests that involve confounding task-demands. For 
example, while performance on semantic fluency tests might reflect the organisation of 
semantic information, it also requires retrieval strategies, which make metacognitive 
demands. In addition, although asking participants to define words yields information about 
semantic representations without requiring the participant to retrieve a name, it requires not 
only knowledge of the word’s meaning, but also an understanding of what a “definition” is 
and how it is normally given; specifically, that it is a test of knowledge of the salient and 
diagnostic features of a category, to be listed in descending order of salience and 
diagnosticity. Poor performance on a definitions task, then, may arise from lexical-semantic 
problems but also from metacognitive demands (Benelli, Arcuri, & Marchesini, 1988). Thus, 
the WS group that performed similarly to a DS group on a definitions task in Bellugi and 
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colleagues’ study (Bellugi et al., 1988) may have done so for metacognitive reasons, rather 
than for lexical-semantic ones. 
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether there might be less information in the 
WS lexicon than suggested by vocabulary level. This is important for two reasons. First, it is 
important so that caregivers or teachers can interact with people with WS at a level 
appropriate to their intellectual ability, rather than the ability superficially suggested by their 
vocabulary. Second, it is important in order that theorists may accurately interpret what the 
presence of advanced vocabulary per se means for the developmental dissociation of 
cognitive abilities. Two paradigms were used to assess knowledge of the same semantic 
domain, with both participants with WS and typically developing controls. The first 
examined lexical-semantic processes with a definitions test; the second was a categorisation 
task in which participants were asked to sort objects into semantic categories. While the 
definitions task was expected to suffer from metacognitive confounds, the categorisation task 
was expected to minimise such confounding demands. However, it was necessary to conduct 
the definitions test in order to ascertain whether or not metacognitive concerns about the test 
were justified. If there were a convergence of performance on the two tests, it would suggest 
that the definitions task represents a valid measure of lexical-semantic knowledge. 
Both paradigms focused on the same knowledge domain, animals, to facilitate cross-task 
comparison. Clearly, it is important to test with a domain in which individuals with WS are 
well versed, otherwise poor performance could be attributed to poor knowledge. Focusing on 
the domain of animals should maximise the chances of success at the tasks for the 
participants with WS, because it has been shown that individuals with WS as young as 10 
have unimpaired basic knowledge in this area compared to verbal MA matched controls 
(Johnson & Carey, 1998). 
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Because WS is a developmental disorder, the data were analysed within a developmental 
framework. A developmental trajectories approach was adopted (Thomas, Annaz, Ansari, 
Scerif, Jarrold & Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). Functions of task performance and age are 
constructed, which allow developmental change to be compared across typically- and 
atypically-developing groups. Although longitudinal methods would ideally be used to 
investigate developmental change, a first approximation of developmental trajectories can 
derive from cross-sectional studies; these initial trajectories may subsequently be validated by 
longitudinal investigations. One benefit of employing trajectories that link performance on a 
task to a mental age measure is that they can be used to examine whether that performance is 
in line with the developmental state of other measures of cognitive ability, thereby assessing 
developmental relations within the atypical cognitive system. Although it is to be expected 
that people with WS will not perform at a CA-appropriate level, it may be that verbal mental-
age normalises performance, which would show that typical developmental relations exist in 
the language systems of individuals with WS. 
Method 
Participants 
There were two groups: 45 typically developing (TD) individuals and 15 individuals with a 
clinical diagnosis of Williams syndrome (WS) confirmed by the fluorescence in situ 
hybridisation (FISH) test. In a preliminary test session, the WS group was assessed on the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale II (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997), a 
measure of receptive vocabulary. The WS group had a mean chronological age of 21;5 years 
(range = 12;0-44;11) and a mean vocabulary mental age of 9;7 years (range = 4;1-17;0). The 
vocabulary age for 3 older participants was at ceiling (17;0). Taking into account this ceiling 
(i.e., assigning all members of the WS group with CAs above 17;0 a CA of 17;0), the 
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standardised vocabulary test indicated a disparity between chronological and vocabulary age 
of 5 years and 11 months (t(14) = 5.521, p<.001). Receptive vocabulary was therefore clearly 
delayed in this group. The TD group had a mean chronological age of 7;6 years (range = 5;1-
10;1) and a mean vocabulary mental age of 8;1 years (range = 5;1-13;1). Each participant 
consented to take part on the day of testing. 
Materials 
Definitions test 
Using the Oxford Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1988), 21 animals were selected for the 
participants to define, varying in frequency. A mixture of basic and superordinate category 
levels were selected. The animals chosen were bird, fish, cat, lion, bee, elephant, ant, 
tortoise, spider, dolphin, kangaroo, crab, penguin, dinosaur, bat, beetle, whale, mammal, 
carnivore, reptile and marsupial. 
Categorisations Test 
There were 20 categorisation questions in total. There were two rationales behind the choice 
of probe and animal grouping: 
1. To investigate participants’ responses to probes for properties not deducible from the 
available perceptual features 
2. To examine the effect of perceptually similar distractors on these probes 
Table 1 lists the categorisation questions. 
======== insert Table 1 about here ========= 
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Toy animals were used as stimuli (see Appendix 1 for the stimulus toys used for each 
categorisation question). These were kept covered during the definitions test so that 
participants could not base their definitions on the visual features of the toys. 
Procedure 
The definitions test was administered before the categorisation test. 
Definitions test 
Participants were asked, ‘What’s an x? Or can you tell me what an x is?’ If necessary, 
participants were also asked, ‘if you had to make another child understand what an x is, who 
did not know what it was, what would you say to help him?’ After the initial response, 
participants were prompted twice further for each animal with the phrase ‘Is there anything 
else you can tell me about x?’ The animals to be defined were presented in the same order for 
all participants. The superordinate definitions, such as ‘mammal’, ‘reptile or ‘marsupial’, 
were requested after the basic animal definitions, in order to avoid them priming participants’ 
responses. 
The dependent measures were the number of correct features, and the number of salient and 
diagnostic features, given for each animal. Salient and diagnostic features were defined as 
those that allowed animals to be distinguished from each other or appear central to common 
definitions. This definition is necessarily subjective, because relevance of particular features 
for a particular goal (in this case, defining animals) is a matter of degree (Sperber & Wilson, 
1987; Wilson & Sperber, 2004). To illustrate our use of these terms, an example of a feature 
that is both salient and diagnostic is stripes for a zebra. The fact that a zebra has four legs is 
salient but clearly not diagnostic. The fact that a frog breathes through its skin while 
underwater is diagnostic of frogs but not salient (or at least would not be expected to be 
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salient for our sample). In contrast, thematically or episodically related information would not 
be considered either salient or diagnostic (e.g. “I saw one on TV last night”, “It’s my 
brother’s favourite animal”). 
Categorisations test 
Participants were asked to group the animals according to the question asked. As a practice 
trial, a group of animals was placed on the table and the participants were asked to sort out 
which animals might be found in the circus. They were laid out in an order that did not 
correspond to the category question. As the animals were put out, the experimenter also 
named them. The category questions were administered in the same order for each 
participant. The dependent measure was the number of animals correctly placed within the 
probed category on each trial. 
 
Results 
Each of the following analyses is a repeated-measures ANCOVA with group as the between-
subjects factor. The ANCOVA model included interaction terms between the verbal mental 
age (VMA) covariate and the between-subjects factor, to explore whether performance 
developed at a different rate in each group with respect to vocabulary ability (Thomas et al., 
2009). The data were analysed with respect to VMA, rather than chronological age (CA), for 
two reasons. First, many studies have already established that lexico-semantic knowledge is 
not at CA-appropriate level in WS (e.g. Clahsen et al., 2004; Temple et al., 2002). Our 
participants with WS similarly demonstrated a delay in their receptive vocabulary ability 
compared to CA of around 6 years. Second, the key aim of the study is to investigate 
developmental relationships, namely whether lexico-semantic knowledge is commensurate 
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with vocabulary. It should be noted that three of the participants with WS were at ceiling 
(17;0 years) on the BPVS.  
Definitions task 
Correct features 
There was a reliable positive relationship between VMA and the number of correct features 
given, F(1,56) = 21.775, p < .001, ηp2 = .280, but no significant main effect of group, F(1,56) 
= 0.449, p = .505, ηp2 = .008. There was, however, a reliable interaction of group and VMA, 
F(1,56) = 4.753, p < .05, ηp2 = .078 (see Figure 1). Analysing the groups separately revealed 
that the number of correct features given reliably increased with VMA for the TD group, 
F(1,43) = 23.497, p < .001, ηp2 = .353, but not the WS group, F(1,13) = 2.559, p = .134, ηp2 = 
.164. At younger VMA, the TD and WS groups performed similarly, but there was evidence 
of divergence with faster development in the TD group thereafter. Overall, at higher 
vocabulary levels, definitions provided by individuals with WS were poorer than those of the 
TD controls. 
======== insert Figure 1 about here ========= 
 
Salient and diagnostic features 
The number of salient and diagnostic features reliably increased with VMA, F(1,56) = 
78.982, p < .001, ηp2 = .585, but there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,56) = 
1.050, p = .310, ηp2 = .018. However, performance improved with VMA faster in the TD 
group than in the WS group, F(1,56) = 17.232, p < .001, ηp2 = .235 (see Figure 2). Again, at 
lower vocabulary abilities the performance of the groups overlapped but the trajectories then 
diverged with the performance of the TD group developing more quickly. 
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======== insert Figure 2 about here ========= 
 
Analysis of Errors 
An error was defined as an incorrect feature offered for a given animal, and did not include 
omissions or irrelevant comments. The TD group’s mean number of errors for each trial was 
0.34 (SD = 0.21), the WS group’s was 0.38 (SD = 0.21). Although the number of errors 
reliably decreased with increasing VMA, F(1,56) = 6.456, p < .05, ηp2 = .103, there was no 
significant main effect of group, F(1,56) < 0.001, p = .997, ηp2 < .001, nor interaction of 
group and VMA, F(1,56) = 0.794, p = .377, ηp2 = .014. There was no fixed number of 
responses in this task, so the errors would not be expected to mirror the correct responses. 
Feature analysis 
The type of features produced was examined in more detail. Perceptual features were defined 
as those that could be known by recalling a mental image of a given animal (e.g., has a beak, 
has big ears); abstract features were those that could not be known from imagery of the 
animal alone (e.g., is poisonous, lives underground). 
Overall, more perceptual features were given than abstract ones, F(1,58) = 17.247, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .229. Although there was no reliable interaction of VMA and feature type for the TD 
group, F(1,43) = 0.476, p = .494, ηp2 = .011, there was for the WS group, F(1,13) = 6.935, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .348 (see Figure 3). While the WS group produced more abstract features with 
increasing VMA, F(1,13) = 26.535, p < .001, ηp2 = .671, there was no significant change in 
the number of perceptual features, F(1,13) = 0.200, p = .662, ηp2 = .015. The overall 
decrement in total features at higher receptive vocabulary levels therefore stems from the 
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absence of relevant perceptual detail rather than the properties of the animal (e.g., how it 
behaves, where it lives). 
======== insert Figure 3 about here ========= 
Definitions task summary 
Performance on the definitions task developed more slowly with VMA for the WS group than 
the TD group, measured by both the number of correct features and the number of salient and 
diagnostic features. However, this performance difference was not associated with any 
developmental group difference in errors. This implies that less semantic information is being 
acquired by the WS group, despite increasing vocabulary, or at least that less semantic 
information was elicited by this particular task. 
Categorisation task 
Correct categorisations 
Performance on this measure improved reliably with VMA, F(1,56) = 26.255, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.319, and the TD group scored significantly better than the WS group, F(1,56) = 10.800, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .162. However, there was no reliable interaction of VMA and group, F(1,56) = 
0.311, p = .579, ηp2 = .006 (see Figure 4). The TD group performed better than the WS group 
at all VMA levels, but both groups developed at the same rate, with no divergence of the 
trajectories.  
======== insert Figure 4 about here ========= 
Incorrect categorisations 
Incorrect categorisations were defined as inclusion errors, i.e. animals incorrectly placed 
within the category probed by a given question. The TD group’s mean number of errors for 
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each trial was 0.61 (SD = 0.29), the WS group’s was 0.73 (SD = 0.42). The WS group made 
more of these errors than the TD group, F(1,56) = 5.460, p < .05, ηp2 = .089, and there was a 
significant interaction of group and VMA, F(1,56) = 16.419, p < .001, ηp2 = .227. While there 
was no reliable trend with VMA for such errors in the WS group, F(1,13) = 0.507, p = .489, 
ηp
2 
= .038, the TD group showed a decrease in such errors with increasing VMA, F(1,43) = 
33.074, p < .001, ηp2 = .435. Therefore, the TD group tended to miscategorise less with 
increasing VMA, while the WS group retained the same level of errors across the VMA 
range. 
Perceptual distractors 
It was not possible to perform a meaningful feature analysis (as in the definitions task 
analysis), because no perceptual features were probed, as such. This is because perceptual 
information was readily available in the animal toys themselves. Instead, abstract features 
were probed, such as “Which live in a nest?” (See Appendix 1 for probes). However, it was 
still possible to investigate performance on trials that involved perceptual distractors (e.g. 
“Which are birds?”, where the response set was eagle, swan, penguin, dragonfly [with 
wings], sea lion, horse, bat [also with wings]). The TD group performed significantly better 
than the WS group on such trials, F(1,56) = 4.399, p < .05, ηp2 = .073, and there was a reliable 
interaction of group and VMA, F(1,56) = 15.017, p < .001, ηp2 = .211: while the TD group’s 
performance improved reliably with increasing VMA, F(1,43) = 24.137, p < .001, ηp2 = .360, 
the WS group’s did not, F(1,13) = 0.451, p = .513, ηp2 = .034 (see Figure 5). 
======== insert Figure 5 about here ========= 
Categorisation task summary 
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For their level of receptive vocabulary, the TD group was better able to correctly categorise 
animals than the WS group. In addition, the WS group tended to make more errors than the 
TD group. The groups’ ability to categorise correctly developed at a similar rate. However, as 
measured by performance on trials that involved perceptual distractors, abstract knowledge 
developed more slowly in the WS group than predicted by receptive vocabulary. 
Cross-task comparison  
In order to compare the performance of the WS group across tasks, it was necessary to make 
the measures used in each task comparable. One way to achieve this is to standardise the WS 
group’s performance on the range of variability of the TD group (see Jarrold & Brock, 2004; 
Thomas, Annaz, Ansari, Scerif, Jarrold & Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). This standardisation 
generates Z-scores for each participant with WS, showing how far away performance is from 
that predicted by VMA, if the participant had been on the TD trajectory.  
In order to directly compare performance on the definitions task with that on the 
categorisation task, participants’ mean scores for each task were converted into Z-scores. 
Each participant’s performance was standardised with respect to the distribution of scores for 
the typically developing children in each task. Figure 6 shows cross-task trajectories based on 
these Z-scores. Simple effects of task were independent of the covariate of VMA,  because 
the covariate is a between-subjects factor, whereas task is a repeated-measures factor (see the 
following link for discussion of the use of repeated measures in ANCOVA: 
http://www.psyc.bbk.ac.uk/research/DNL/stats/Repeated_Measures_ANCOVA.html). 
Therefore, these results are reported from an analysis that excludes the covariate (Degrees of 
freedom therefore differ between simple task effects and group effects or interactions). The 
TD group showed very similar relationships between each task and VMA, F(1,43) = 0.054, p 
= .817, ηp2 = .001 (simple effects of task would be meaningless for the TD group, because the 
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mean Z-score for each task is zero by definition). The WS group’s performance on the 
categorisation task was reliably worse than that their performance on the definitions task, 
F(1,14) = 13.109, p < .01, ηp2 = .484, though there was no significant difference in the 
gradients of the trajectories, F(1,13) = 1.386, p = .260, ηp2 = .096. Figure 6 also captures the 
divergence of the WS trajectory from the TD trajectory with increasing VMA, while the 
category trajectory runs parallel. 
======== insert Figure 6 about here ========= 
 
As a final comparison between the definitions and categorisation tasks, performance with 
‘elephant’ was examined in each, using the features probed in the categorisation task: ‘where 
it lives’, ‘what it eats’, ‘source of ivory’, ‘is a mammal’, and ‘lives for a long time’. 
‘Elephant’ was chosen for this analysis because it had the highest number of features probed 
in the categorisation task  that also appeared in the definitions task. Figure 7 demonstrates 
that the features related to elephants that were probed in the categorisation task were more 
often successfully responded to in this task than they were produced in the definitions task, 
F(1,58) = 200.192, p < .001, ηp2 = .775. While there was no reliable group difference in how 
often these features were produced in the definitions task, F(1,58) = 1.697, p = .198, ηp2 = 
.028, the TD group successfully categorised the elephant on the basis of these features 
significantly more often than the WS group did, F(1,58) = 18.253, p < .001, ηp2 = .239 (see 
Figures 7a and 7b).  
======== insert Figures 7a and 7b about here ========= 
 
Discussion 
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The aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between lexico-semantic knowledge 
and vocabulary in WS compared to a TD control group. Two tasks were used to measure 
lexico-semantic knowledge: a definitions task, which was expected to make additional 
metacognitive demands, and a categorisation task, which was considered a purer test of 
lexico-semantic knowledge. The results indicated that the WS group’s performance on the 
definitions task began at a level commensurate with VMA, but diverged from that of the 
typically developing group. The WS group’s performance on the categorisation task 
developed at a similar rate to that of the typically developing participants, but was markedly 
poorer on average than predicted by VMA. This surprising pattern of results indicates that 
individuals with WS have less lexico-semantic knowledge than expected given their level of 
receptive vocabulary, although this knowledge appears to develop in step with vocabulary at 
this lower level. These results also suggest that metacognitive concerns about the definitions 
task may be well-founded, a point to which we return below. 
The WS group’s disparity of lexico-semantic knowledge and receptive vocabulary may be 
due, at least in part, to poorly-delineated semantic categories: the WS group made more 
categorisation errors than the TD group, with the effects of VMA accounted for. Moreover, 
while the TD group made fewer such errors with increasing VMA, presumably reflecting 
increasingly well-defined category boundaries, no such trend was evident for the WS group. 
These results are in line with a previous finding that individuals with WS acquire additional 
lexico-semantic information throughout development, without accompanying conceptual 
change. Johnson and Carey (1998) suggested that cocktail party syndrome in WS results from 
adequate ‘enrichment’ learning processes in the absence of analytic and metacognitive skills. 
Udwin and Yule (1990) had found that about a third of a sample of 43 children with WS met 
the criteria for cocktail party syndrome, which include well-formed speech that nevertheless 
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lacks communicative content, along with frequent use of conversational fillers and 
stereotypical social phrases. Johnson and Carey predicted a dissociation between general 
knowledge of animals (e.g., number of legs, what it eats, where it lives) and core folk-
biological concepts (e.g., the determinants of species identity, the notion that humans are one 
animal of many). They tested intuitive biological knowledge in WS and two TD groups, one 
matched on VMA and the other a non-matched group of 6-year-olds. The WS group 
performed similarly to the VMA-matched group on a test battery for biological general 
knowledge, but performed significantly worse on a test battery for folk-biological concepts 
thought to be acquired between the ages of six and twelve, and at a similar level to the 6-
year-olds. The authors concluded that the WS group had not acquired folk-biological 
concepts appropriate for VMA, even though the requisite general knowledge was probably in 
place1.  
A recent study of comprehension of non-literal similarity provides a parallel with Johnson 
and Carey’s results. Thomas et al. (submitted) administered a simple picture-based 
categorisation task to individuals with WS and children between 5 and 11. The results 
indicated that the individuals with WS understood both perceptual similarity across category 
boundaries (e.g., an orange is perceptually similar to the Sun) and also functional similarity 
across category boundaries (e.g., an oven and the Sun both heat things up). However, in 
contrast to the TD group, the WS group did not develop a preference for functional similarity 
over perceptual similarity in comparison judgements, consistent with the notion that 
individuals with WS do not develop a conceptual structure that flexibly utilises functional 
relations, despite showing clear evidence that functional relations themselves have been 
encoded. This is consistent with Johnson and Carey’s finding that the WS group 
demonstrated evidence of the requisite pieces of knowledge on which to base functional 
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categories but not evidence of functionally-organised categories which would be necessary to 
make similarity judgements. Taken together with the results of the current study, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that individuals with WS have poorer organisation of knowledge than 
predicted by the amount of knowledge they have accrued. 
One puzzling aspect of our results is that in the definitions task, while both groups gave more 
abstract features with increasing VMA, and the TD group also produced more perceptual 
features, the WS group demonstrated no such increase in production of perceptual features. 
This appears to be because the youngest participants were particularly unlikely to produce 
abstract features, rather than because the older children were particularly likely to do so. In 
the categorisation task, the WS group performed more poorly than the TD group on 
categorisations that involved perceptual distractors (e.g. “Which are birds?” with dragonfly 
and bat among the distractors). Furthermore, while the TD group’s performance on such trials 
improved with VMA, the WS group showed no mental-age-related trend. This suggests that 
the participants with WS found perceptual features particularly salient, which may go some 
way to explaining why abstract features were offered less often by younger participants with 
WS in the definitions task.  
In order to further compare performance across tasks, additional analyses were conducted, 
focusing on one of the animals probed in the study, elephant, on a feature-by-feature basis. 
The features of ‘elephant’ probed in the categorisation tasks were ‘where it lives’, ‘what it 
eats’, ‘source of ivory’, ‘is a mammal’, and ‘lives for a long time’; these same features were 
produced by participants in the definitions task. These salient and diagnostic features were 
very rarely offered in the definitions task, despite the fact that such knowledge was often 
demonstrated in the categorisation task. This pattern of results reflects the relative 
insensitivity of the definitions task for assessing knowledge of salient and diagnostic features. 
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In order to perform well on a definitions task, the participant must list features in descending 
order of salience and diagnosticity. However, the participant must also understand that this is 
what is required for task success. It is not clear that younger typically developing children or 
individuals with developmental disorders will understand this, or would even be helped by 
careful explanation, given the metacognitive nature of understanding and monitoring task 
success. While there was no group difference in how often these features were produced in 
the definitions task, the TD group successfully categorised the elephant on the basis of these 
features more often than the WS group did. This pattern of results repeats the message from 
the main analyses: the participants with WS demonstrated lexico-semantic knowledge that 
was poorer than predicted by receptive vocabulary, but developed at a similar rate to that 
observed in typical development. 
Another, more tentative, way of comparing performance across tasks is to contrast the salient 
and diagnostic features given in the definitions task with correct categorisations, given that 
categorisations were always made on the basis of salient and diagnostic features. Although, at 
lower vocabulary abilities, the performance of the groups was similar, the performance of the 
TD group developed more quickly than that of the WS group. In contrast, the WS group were 
stably poorer than the TD group across the entire developmental trajectory in the 
categorisation task. Whether comparing the categorisation task to the definitions task in terms 
of total correct features or salient and diagnostic ones, different patterns of performance were 
seen across the two tasks, indicating that the tasks were measuring different abilities, 
consistent with the suggestion that asking participants to produce definitions assesses 
metacognitive skills in addition to lexico-semantic knowledge (cf. Benelli et al., 1988). 
Finally, the findings of the current study are in line with those of Temple and colleagues 
(Temple et al., 2002; Clahsen, Ring, & Temple, 2004), who found that individuals with WS 
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performed worse at a version of the BPVS with more semantic distractors than typically 
developing controls matched on MA. Temple and colleagues suggested that the standard 
version of the BPVS may overestimate lexico-semantic knowledge in WS because, through 
its forced choice design (i.e., which one of four pictures goes with the named word), 
decisions can be made without possessing full knowledge of the word meaning. The results 
of the current study support this conclusion. In the absence of some ‘gold standard’ measure 
of language ability, it is not possible to definitively state whether lexico-semantic knowledge 
is worse than other areas of language in WS. It is possible that lexico-semantics only appears 
to be out of step with vocabulary in WS because the BPVS is a poor measure of vocabulary 
for some populations of individuals with learning difficulties. As with many standardised 
tests, the BPVS is far from ‘pure’, but involves many non-central task demands, such as 
holding the task aim in mind, inhibiting responding on the basis of simply liking a picture, 
and the ability to generalise from tokens to types. The possible limitations of the BPVS for 
atypical populations point to the same conclusion as the current data. Assertions of 
exceptional lexical knowledge in Williams syndrome should be treated with caution. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 While no task in the biological general knowledge battery appeared to make particular 
metacognitive demands, two of the five tasks of the folk-biological concepts battery may 
have done so (Death, as part of which participants were asked several open-ended questions 
about death, such as “What happens to a person when they die?”, and Species 
Transformations, in which stories were told of animals being transformed to look like other 
animals [e.g. a tiger into a lion], either by dressing-up or by surgery, and participants were 
asked, e.g., “Is it a tiger or a lion?”). Despite these concerns, the same basic pattern of results 
held across all five tasks of the folk-biological concepts battery. 
31 
 
Table 1. 
Categorisation questions and whether perceptual distractors were used in each case 
Categorisation question Perceptual distractors? 
  
Which would you find in the sea? N 
Which are birds? Y 
Which are insects? Y 
Which are farm animals? Y 
Which are jungle animals? N 
Which can fly? N 
Which eat meat/fish vs. grass/vegetation? N 
Which live in hot places vs. cold places? N 
Which can swim well? N 
Which live in a nest? N 
Which make ivory? N 
Which can sting? Y 
Which can lay eggs? N 
Which are the two biggest in real life vs. two smallest? Y 
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Which are rare and which are common animals? N 
Which are reptiles? N 
Which are mammals? N 
Which ones live to be very old? N 
Is a penguin the same kind of thing as a sea lion or 
eagle? 
Y 
Is an octopus the same kind of thing as a jellyfish or 
spider? 
Y 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Mean number of correct features given by participants in the definitions task plotted 
against verbal mental age in years. WS = Williams syndrome, TD = typically developing.  
Figure 2. Mean number of salient/diagnostic features given by participants in the definitions 
task plotted against verbal mental age in years. WS = Williams syndrome, TD = typically 
developing.  
Figure 3. Mean number of perceptual and abstract features given by participants in the 
definitions task plotted against verbal mental age in years. WS = Williams syndrome, TD = 
typically developing. Note the low R2 value for the TD perceptual trajectory reflects wide 
variation despite an overall increase with age. 
Figure 4. Mean number of correct categorisations plotted against verbal mental age in years. 
WS = Williams syndrome, TD = typically developing.  
Figure 5. Mean number of correct categorisations on trials with perceptual distractors plotted 
against verbal mental age in years. WS = Williams syndrome, TD = typically developing.  
Figure 6. Z-scores by group and task plotted against verbal mental age in years. WS = 
Williams syndrome, TD = typically developing.  
Figure 7a. Mean number of correct features given by participants for ‘elephant’ in the 
definitions task plotted against verbal mental age in years. WS = Williams syndrome, TD = 
typically developing.  
Figure 7b. Mean number of correct categorisations for ‘elephant’ plotted against verbal 
mental age in years. WS = Williams syndrome, TD = typically developing.  
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
R² = 0.3084
R² = 0.3333
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
M
e
a
n
 C
o
rr
e
ct
 C
a
te
g
o
ri
sa
ti
o
n
s
VMA
TD 
WS
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7a 
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Figure 7b 
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Appendix 1. Stimulus animal toys used in the categorisation task, by question  
 
Categorisation question Within 
category 
Outside 
category 
   
Which would you find in the sea? Crab, 
octopus, 
sealion, 
whale, 
jellyfish 
Frog, 
platypus, 
crocodile, 
stag, lion 
Which are birds? Eagle, 
swan, 
penguin 
Dragonfly, 
sealion, 
horse, bat 
Which are insects? Bee, 
dragonfly, 
beetle, ant 
Octopus, 
crab, calf, 
frog 
Which are farm animals? Pig, cow, 
horse, goat, 
ram 
Zebra, 
cheetah, 
stag, swan 
Which are jungle animals? Elephant, 
lion, 
Sealion, 
horse, bear, 
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panther, 
rhino 
penguin 
Which can fly? Bee, eagle, 
beetle, bat 
Jellyfish, 
spider, 
penguin, pig 
Which eat meat/fish vs. grass/vegetation? Whale, 
panther, 
bear 
Elephant, 
pig, goat 
Which live in hot places vs. cold places? Zebra, 
snake 
Bear, 
penguin 
Which can swim well? Penguin, 
dolphin, 
octopus, 
crocodile, 
frog 
Rhino, pig, 
cheetah, 
bear, horse 
Which live in a nest? Swan, bee, 
ant 
Crab, cat, 
calf 
Which make ivory? Elephant, 
rhino 
Crocodile, 
dolphin 
Which can sting? Bee, 
jellyfish 
Octopus, 
beetle 
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Which can lay eggs? Swan, 
eagle, 
crocodile,  
T-rex, Frog 
Elephant, 
dolphin, 
pig, bat, 
ram 
Which are the two biggest in real life vs. two smallest? Elephant, 
whale, pig, 
dog 
Tortoise, 
spider, crab, 
bat, ant 
Which are rare and which are common animals? Panther, 
whale, eagle 
Pig, ant, 
horse 
Which are reptiles? T-rex, 
snake, 
crocodile, 
tortoise 
Sealion, 
platypus, 
eagle, 
jellyfish 
Which are mammals? Elephant, 
bat, whale, 
lion 
Frog, 
octopus, 
eagle, beetle 
Which ones live to be very old? Tortoise, 
elephant, 
chimp 
Frog, swan, 
ant 
Is a penguin the same kind of thing as a sea lion or 
eagle? 
Eagle Sealion 
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Is an octopus the same kind of thing as a jellyfish or 
spider? 
Jellyfish Spider 
 
 
 
